Armenia-Diaspora Conference Report
Communication and Linkages Between Diaspora Institutions and
the Republic of Armenia
Prepared for the Armenia Diaspora Conference
Yerevan, September 22-23, 1999
Introduction
This Report is the result of the work of a Subcommittee that was
convened in response to a request made by the Foreign Minister of the
Republic of Armenia, HE Vartan Oskanian. The Subcommittee was invited
to address `communication and linkages between diaspora institutions
and the Republic of Armenia.' It was subsequently asked to define its
mission broadly, so as to consider a range of issues, including the
economic.
For several weeks, the Subcommittee discussed the nature of the
relationship between the Republic and the Diaspora, reviewing what the
communication problems of the relationship had been and how they might
be improved. The Subcommittee produced over sixty pages of memos. From
these, the Subcommittee Chair distilled several versions of a draft
report. Prior to finalizing this report a draft was submitted to
Mr. Oskanian for his review. Comments made were accordingly
incorporated in this final draft. What follows is the final result of
that process.
Members of the Subcommittee raised many issues and analyzed them from
different perspectives; scholarly, intellectual and political
perspectives differed widely in some cases. There was much debate and
some strong disagreement. It was resolved that the Report should first
articulate the shared assumptions of its authors about the Diaspora
before offering concrete analyses and recommendations about major
topics grouped under several headings.
The Nature of the Diaspora
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The `Diaspora' is a condition shared by nearly half of all
Armenians. However, as a social formation or a polity, it is not yet a
single entity.
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Nevertheless, the members of this Subcommittee, who are familiar with
the communities of the Middle Eastern and western diasporas, find that
in the context of this Report it makes sense to speak of those
diasporas as though they make up a single entity, `the Diaspora.'
Most of the leaders and many of the members of these diasporic
communities conceive of themselves as being in one Diaspora, both vis
a vis Armenia and in relation to each other. Migration from one to the
other is frequent, travel between them very common. The frequent
movement of people, capital, ideas, cultural artifacts and electronic
information have created favorable conditions both for intra-diasporic
and diaspora-homeland communication, thus decreasing isolation and
increasing the possibility of sustaining diasporic identity and
commitment.
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Furthermore, despite ideological and institutional conflict, many
leaders of this Diaspora regard it as a portion of one Armenian
nation, which they see as consisting of diverse yet interconnected
units, and they welcome the phenomenon of the Republic of Armenia
convening an Armenia-Diaspora Conference in 1999 (henceforth ADC99),
because they hope that this will be a forum not just for airing
differences but above all for seeking common ground and for
establishing the foundations of transnational cooperation among
Armenians from the Diaspora, CIS, Eastern Europe, Karabagh and the
Republic of Armenia.
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However, the diversity of the Diaspora must not be underestimated. It
consists of dozens of communities, each with its own culture and
internal structure, scattered across five continents. Each has its
organizations, some local, some national, and a few transnational,
like the major political parties, the Churches, the AGBU, and some of
the larger compatriotic unions. No single organization, whether local
or transnational, can claim to represent all diaspora Armenians.
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This Subcommittee has little experience of the emerging diasporas of
Armenians emigrating from Armenia. It seems likely that they, too,
lack fully representative organizations. In the immediate future,
officials from the Republic, working with homeland and Diaspora
scholars and with community leaders wherever they may be found, must
begin to study and organize systematically the emerging diasporas of
the CIS, Eastern Europe and those parts of the US where there is a
large community of Armenians from Armenia.
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It is essential that future discussion focus on new and newly
conceptualized relations between the Homeland and the Diaspora. This
does not mean that older organizations no longer have a role to
play. It does mean that they need to engage in open-ended and
continuing dialogue with other organizations, with the Republic, and
with experts and active community members who do not yet formally
belong to organizations.
Representation
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The question of representation is a question of communication: who
will speak in whose name, to whom, and on what grounds? This
Subcommittee can speak about the Diaspora, but not for it. Even our
largest and best organized transnational organizations can at best
claim to represent only 20 - 40% of a given community.
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Precisely because this is the case, the government of Armenia is to be
commended for having invited a large number of participants to the
ADC99. Though this runs the risk of creating a disorderly atmosphere,
it helps to avoid repetition of regrettable past events in which
previous governments of Armenia did not deal even-handedly with all
relevant segments of the Diaspora.
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ADC99 should be the first of a series of smaller ADCs organized
according to more clearly spelled out principles of representation and
delegate selection. It is therefore recommended that ADC99 create a
Standing Committee on Community Representation (henceforth SCCR,
cf. the Standing Committee on Economic Development, par. 21), made up
of an equal number of diasporic and homeland members, or even a
majority of the former, and charged with making recommendations on
questions of representation to the Steering Committee of the next
ADC. The SCCR will also be the appropriate venue for discussing
existing exemplars of effective cooperation between various diasporic
groups (e.g. the April 24 committee in France) as models of
representation. It should also initiate planning that at some point in
the future may enable it to legitimately claim that it is the global
forum for debating issues of relevance to the Armenian nation..
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The SCCR should recommend protocols that will insure the effective
participation of diaspora Armenians in our transnational life. To do
so, it should be endowed with a staff and budget that enables it to
consult with the Diaspora, but also with scholars and government
officials in countries that are innovating new forms of diasporan
involvement in transnational political representation, ranging from
facilitated dual citizenship to special representatives in the
homeland's Parliament. The actions of Israel, Poland, South Africa,
Haiti, Portugal, India, the Dominican Republic, Mexico and Colombia
are among those that merit further study.
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A series of continuing, properly planned, funded and inclusive small
conferences between the SCCR and various groups in the Diaspora and
the Republic will be an essential precondition for developing
understanding, communication and cooperation. There will be complex
questions of funding and administration for such conferences. These
must be addressed; while such funding is not easily available, it must
be considered an initial investment in the future of Armenia and the
Armenian nation.
Models of Relationship between Homeland and Diaspora
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Center-periphery models for relations between the government of the
Homeland and the Diaspora should be avoided. When the eventual
objective is the best communication, consultation and cooperation
between Homeland and Diaspora, neither can be defined by a handful of
leaders or centers, be they in Yerevan or in major Diaspora
organizations. It is recommended that all concerned conceptualize and
work for the emergence of a multilateral system of relationships
between the Homeland society and the Diaspora, in which Homeland and
Diaspora are considered part of an open, pluralistic network that
invites participation without prohibitive costs or entrance
requirements, subject to certain protocols which, if not followed,
will result in expulsion from the network.
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The Subcommittee urges ADC99 to recognize that the best communication
will happen if contacts are not conducted through a single government
office, but rather between many diaspora individuals and organizations
and homeland elements. The civil society emerging in the Homeland must
be in touch, in as many ways as possible, with the various
organizations and individuals of the Diaspora's many social formations
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This model may raise in the minds of many Armenians the question of
`equality.' Some, usually in Armenia, might dismiss the concept of
equality between the two with contempt, while others, usually in the
Diaspora, insist on it with naivete. But the question of `equality' is
misleading. It is pointless to speak of the equality of two
incommensurate entities. The Homeland and the Diaspora should learn to
act either as equal partners or as senior-junior partners, depending
on the proportion of capital and human assets each brings to a
specific project. A project-oriented, partnership-based approach
should define at least the initial stages of Homeland-Diaspora
cooperation.
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The government of Armenia may initially find it difficult to deal with
the Diaspora as a partner, but the experience of the past decade has
shown that unless both entities learn to work as partners on the
issues and projects that concern both, no long-lasting success is
possible. The coordination of assistance, development or investment
projects does not require an abstract declaration of equality, but
rather proper consideration of the interests of both entities, viewed
as partners in Armenia's development. Partnership and participation
require frank communication in a democratic atmosphere. Western-style
economic development will not flourish in any other environment. The
trust that has been eroded in both the diaspora and the homeland can
and must be rebuilt on this more realistic basis.
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Such rebuilding will be facilitated by the recognition of what
democracy has taught. Communication, persuasion, consultation and
cooperation, rather than dictation or naïve concepts of equality,
are indispensable. Governments around the world are learning that
within emerging democracies, they cannot dictate to their own
citizens. This is all the more reason for the government of Armenia to
realize that it will be unable to dictate successfully to diasporans
who are not even its own citizens. Equally, it is important for
diasporans to learn that dictating to the homeland is
unthinkable. They will also be obligated to acknowledge that most
Diaspora organizations are not fully democratic, just as many aspects
of life in the Homeland are not. Both parties must practice the
virtues of democratic partnership, between government and people,
diaspora and homeland.
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An auspicious step towards such practice has been taken by the
government of Armenia which, by organizing this Conference, recognizes
the importance of the Diaspora. In turn, the Diaspora must acknowledge
that being taken seriously brings with it new and costly
responsibilities.
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It is not recommended that the Conference create a standing committee
to pursue the ideals of democratic partnership. Rather, the
Declaration of Principles which should emerge from this conference
(see par.36) should specify a commitment to the values, structures and
the operational and protocols of democratic partnership.
Modalities of Cooperation
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The different modalities of cooperation - be they in economic,
political and cultural relations - must not be viewed as
existing in a strict hierarchy, such that development of one depends
entirely on prior development of the other. Any notion that the
political, or the economic, or the cultural, is `central' and must
have strict priority, while the other concerns are peripheral and
derivative, merely reintroduces an impractical center-periphery
ideology that should be rejected, however appealing the short-term
economic possibilities of such an option may seem. There should be
continuing and simultaneous work on all relevant issues. Within that
framework, many issues which now seem insurmountably difficult could
become easier to resolve in the near future.
Economic Cooperation and Development
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Given Armenia's economic needs, it is understandable that the
government of Armenia might wish to use this occasion as a platform
for commissioning a body that deals with the economic assistance that
the Diaspora is capable of providing. This assistance can be in four
forms: remittances sent by conationals to their relatives; charitable
donations; aid earmarked for the development of infra-structure, as
seen in the past in the construction of the Goris-Stepanakert road;
and investment in the economy, whether guided by the choices of
individual investors or coordinated through a Diaspora-Armenia
development council.
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Remittances and charitable donations by individuals, relatives and
organizations are difficult to direct over the long-term through
governmental action. Government tax policy and its treatment of
remittances as taxable income may become an issue in the future. After
the initial stage of donor fatigue, which set in during the late1990s,
the best results will be obtained if dependable information and access
are freely available to those diasporans who choose to engage in such
work.
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Current assumptions about infra-structural aid may lead to premature
dismissal of its continuing value, in favor of investment (the fourth
option). Notwithstanding recent shortcomings in the administration of
groups such as the Armenia Fund, properly scaled and targeted
infra-structural assistance will remain an important form of diasporan
assistance to Armenia. The mechanisms of receiver-selection and
donor-cooperation may require revision, but the basic approach
continues to offer attractive opportunities for useful activity to
individual donors and to groups with limited resources, who may be
variously mobilized (e.g. through telethons, community to community
projects and the like).
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An approach that exclusively or primarily prefers development through
large-scale business investment has shortcomings. It appeals to a
relatively small group of the largest and most risk-inclined
individual investors. This creates two problems: under the current
economic, political and managerial realities of Armenia, it will not
be sufficiently attractive and confidence-inspiring; and it will
neglect the importance of developing the involvement of individual
diasporans at all levels of economic capacity and potential, merely
because it does not come in the form of `business investment.' (A
historical parallel with Israel may be of some relevance. Contrary to
popular assumptions, the majority of American Jewish aid to Israel
until the early 1980s was committed to infra-structure: to building
public housing, hospitals and schools for the tide of Jewish refugees
that came from eastern Europe after the Holocaust, from the Arab world
in the Fifties, and from the USSR starting in the 1970s. This both
lightened the burden of the emergent state and allowed Jewish
individuals and communities to identify their donations with concrete,
visible and obviously needed projects that could be named after
donors).
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Increased investment by diaspora businessmen in job-creating
enterprises will be essential for Armenia's sociopolitical stability
and techno-economic development. However, economic data and ideas
about the best paths to capital accumulation and economic development
is abundant and conflicting. It would be inappropriate for this
Subcommittee to make specific recommendations on this issue, except to
say that the historical examples indisputably indicate one thing - no
single approach works everywhere. Pure western capitalism has not
proved to be a consistently effective approach. Hong Kong prospered
under it, whereas a Chinese social formation with the same cultural
ethos, in Singapore, prospered through government-guided
investment. (A very different, politically restrictive and
governmentally guided form of nationalist economic development is also
possible. It guarantees greater social stability but takes more time:
its most familiar examples are those of Kemalist Turkey, 1923-1980,
and Francoist Spain, 1939-1975. This approach leads to a stronger
national government, but involves heavy state controls and so might
diminish the flow of international aid and investment of the sort that
is available now and wasn't earlier).
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Diaspora investment must be regarded as a category of foreign
investment. Realism demands that the government acknowledge that
investment capital has no national loyalties, even in the hands of
Armenian-born investors. The government must not expect western-style
development while retaining Soviet era beliefs that the government of
an impoverished country can both ask for investment and dictate where
and how those investments must be made. It must be prepared to
relinquish most of its control in many areas of investment (but not
necessarily all, cf. Singapore above).
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The government must also commit itself to a wholesale revision of its
legal, financial and tax regulations, and to judicial adjudication and
administration of contract disputes. It should do this while
soliciting the advice and active involvement of diasporan investors,
rather than leaning exclusively on WB/IMF models and economists, whose
usefulness in some countries is indisputable but whose overall success
rate is variable. In the end, the wholesale revision of state
regulations of foreign investment is a huge task which cannot be
effectively completed in the short term; during the lag-time, the
other three forms of diasporic assistance will retain major
importance. Of course, the nature of the relationship between the
Diaspora and the Republic will depend in part on the form of the
Diaspora's financial contribution. For example, charitable donations
and aid for infrastructure each entail different kinds of interaction,
expectations and results. Both the Republic and Diaspora organizations
must remain aware that the type of aid as well as the sums involved
will shape relations.
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It is recommended that the Armenia-Diaspora Conference create a
Standing Committee on Economic Development (SCED) in which the number
of diasporan members must at least equal and perhaps exceed homeland
representation. It should be chaired by a diasporan. This group should
be commissioned to do two things simultaneously: to solicit diasporan
investment; but also to consult with economists and governments in
order to see how other emerging economies have attracted investment
from co-nationals in diaspora, and at what cost. Israel, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and India offer excellent examples. India's handling of
NRI, or non-resident investment, has been productive and
controversial, and merits close study. The SCED should discuss and
coordinate its procedures with the SCCR.
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A series of continuing, properly planned, funded and inclusive small
conferences between this Standing Committee , independent diaspora
businessmen and businesswomen, corporate exceutives, policymakers and
economists will be an essential precondition for developing
communication and cooperation between the homeland and the Diaspora.
Questions of funding and administration for such conferences are
complex and will need to be addressed; while such funding is not
easily available, it must be considered an indispensable initial
investment in the future of Armenia and the Armenian nation.
Establishing Protocols
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The work of sustaining the conferences of the Standing Committees and
preparing a second ADC will also provide occasions for bringing
together the leadership of the Homeland and the major organizations of
the Diaspora, in ways that will create not `unity' - a word we all
wish to avoid - but better cooperation between them. Even though
`unity' will not emerge, it is realistic to anticipate an increase in
productive cooperation. At the very least, working together on future
ADCs will diminish mutual suspicion between the leaders of diaspora
organizations, and will help create a transnational leadership that
knows each other - which is not the case now. This, in turn, may
decrease utterly counterproductive intra-diasporic conflicts in favor
of a balance between healthy competition and cooperation. It may also
eventually foster trust.
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For this to happen, it will be necessary to develop clear protocols on
how both the Diaspora and the Homeland are informed about
projects. The nature and quantity of the contribution that each
participant makes and, crucially, the ways in which credit may be
claimed for such contributions in the Diaspora must be specified. This
means that protocols of truthful communication must guide how each
contributing diasporan group can address its constituency about the
size and impact of its contribution to Armenia. The protocol must
apply to all organizations, large and small, and to all modalities of
activity, but especially the economic. It is difficult for a small
group - the Diasporic Union of Ayndeghatzis, say - to contribute what
it can, say 10% to the construction costs of a needed factory, if it
has legitimate anxieties that its contribution will not be mentioned
when the whole Diaspora and especially its own constituency is flooded
with reports spread by a few large organizations that contributed the
other 90% and that control newspapers, radio or TV stations in major
diaspora communities. Individuals and small diaspora organizations do
not have equal access to diasporic modes of communication and
information - not even in the era of the Internet. And no diaspora
organization will commit funds unless a protocol for sharing credit
fairly and reaching all constituencies is created and enforced. If one
Diaspora organization misrepresents the facts, it must know that all
other organizations and, crucially, the government of Armenia, will
set the record straight. One way to guarantee this is to issue
frequent audited project reports.
Open and Free Communication
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The government of Armenia will need to consider the fact that its
control of communication to its own citizens cannot be allowed to
stand completely unchanged at the expense of the work of Diaspora
organizations. The same rules of open and full reporting concerning
all contributions must prevail on government-controlled news channels.
Dual citizenship and the varieties of political participation:
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The appropriate nature and degree of involvement of diaspora and
homeland in each other's political life has been an insistent issue
wherever open communication and cooperation between the two have
become possible. Until recently, homeland governments have generally
preferred to maximize economic contributions (as remittances,
infra-structural investment or business investment) and to minimize
political, social, religious and cultural involvement (for example,
until the late Sixties secular Zionist Israeli leaders tried to
restrict the political activities of certain Brooklyn Jewish religious
sects as deeply problematic; these responded by relabeling their
contributions as `religious education'). In the past two decades,
however, a recognition has emerged that seeks to balance and optimize
all these forms of involvement.The increasing (and not always formally
legislated) tolerance of dual citizenship has been one such
governmental approach to the problem.
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It is not clear to what extent dual citizenship might increase
Diaspora communication with and participation in the Homeland's life,
in both politics and economics. Comparison with other diasporas
demonstrates a very wide range, about which more detailed reports may
eventually be elicited by the SCCR. Israel, despite its famously
powerful diaspora, has not been politically permissive, requiring a
five-year residence and male military service before extending dual
citizenship to its diaspora brethren. Emigrating Israeli citizens who
form the Israeli diaspora can vote more easily via absentee ballots,
as long as they maintain a notional residence in Israel, periodically
renewing their registration in a former domicile's prefecture, at some
small cost. Poland and South Africa have made voting for emigrants
much easier, requiring registration only at embassies or consulates at
a small cost, followed by absentee balloting. The most actively
changing policies are in poorer countries that receive large
remittances from their diasporas, such as Portugal, the Dominican
republic, Colombia and Haiti - Haiti, a country of nine provinces or
`Departements' in French, has declared its Diaspora its `Dixieme
Departement' and is working on promulgating laws to ensure political
representation in Parliament and better remittances and
investment. The Dominican Republic is going even further, discussing
legislation that will reserve a certain number of seats in its
Parliament for the "special representatives"of its US
diaspora.
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Any recommendation on the dual citizenship issue is premature, but it
may be appropriate, if ADC99 chooses, to initiate discussion of these
issues, with no preconceptions and preconditions. Economic and
political participation from the Diaspora cannot be wholly separated,
but neither is one wholly contingent on the other. Diasporans must
recognize that citizenship is never a free gift - it has costs, be it
the draft or paying to maintain registration. Above all, diasporans
must be reminded that only those living in the homeland are affected
by the economic and political misfortunes of the homeland - therefore,
those not subject to those effects must make a fixed contribution of
some sort if they wish to have a word in the management of the
homeland. Diaspora Armenians are accustomed to the idea that in order
to vote in parish, political party or AGBU and ARS elections they must
pay membership dues, so the idea of paying some sort of dues in lieu
of taxes will not seem alien to them. But the homeland government is
also well-advised to remember that raising the threshold of the costs
of political participation beyond a certain limit runs the risk of
alienating those whose participation is ultimately voluntary, and of
communicating the notion that the Diaspora is fundamentally Other or
Odar. Once again, the old Nation-State model in which the State is the
Center and all others the margins must be qualified by a view in which
various degrees of participation at various cost-scales are
considered.
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This Subcommittee recognizes that some participants of ADC99 will
insist that `we are all one nation' because we all claim some form of
Armenian identity, while others will insist on cultural differences
and different interests. It recognizes that in much of the Diaspora,
the claiming of Armenian identity is largely a voluntary act, and for
that reason the homeland's treatment of the Diaspora must be delicate
and diplomatic. In addition, there is no easy commonality of interests
between the Diaspora and the Homeland, just as there is no easy
commonality of interests among diaspora organizations. But this may
change thanks to the communication, consultation and eventual
cooperation that we hope will be launched by ADC99.
The Minimum that can legitimately be expected from ADC99
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No member of this Subcommittee and no rational diasporan expects much
decisive action from what we hope will be the first of many ADCs. But
certain expectations are reasonable. Without offering an extensive
theoretical rationale, it is possible to assert that bodies like the
ADC, when perceived to be roughly representative and acting in good
faith, gain some of the legitimacy that democratically elected
representative bodies have. Political science speaks of the `surplus
of legitimacy' that is produced when such bodies are regarded as
roughly representative and striving to be more so. It is recommended
that one priority of ADC99 be to produce such `surplus legitimacy'
which, like its model, surplus capital, can be invested to benefit
both the government of Armenia and other participants, now and in
future ADCs, incrementally leading to a transnational Armenian polity.
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To accomplish this aim, this Subcommittee recommends that ADC99
produce a Declaration of Principles. The contents of such a
Declaration can only be specified by ADC99. It might choose to name
indispensable principles on which there is consensus, committing all
participants to the principle of equal and respectful relations
between homeland and diaspora individuals and organizations (`equal'
in the sense mentioned earlier), regardless of political and
organizational commitments, religion, gender and country of origin. It
might acknowledge the aim not of `unity' and `sameness' but of
increasing communication, consultation and cooperation in order to
strengthen the Homeland, now in its hour of need, and to serve all
sections of the Diaspora which may later require the aid of the
homeland's government and of other, more fortunate portions of the
Diaspora.
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This Subcommittee also recommends that the Conference consider
promulgating a Declaration of Objectives, and that a few committees be
immediately created - with balanced participation from the Homeland
and the Diaspora - to set time horizons and measures for seeing those
objectives realized by future conferences, and to begin work.
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As a specific example of feasible Objectives, the Subcommittee
recommends the formation of a Project Committee to plan a
single-platform Armenian keyboard, which will be a major contribution
to communication between Homeland and Diaspora. It should be designed
by a balanced committee that consults computer experts not just in
Armenia or anglophone communities but also in large, non-english
speaking communities in which some word-processing programs not in the
Latin alphabet are already in use. This pan-Armenian cross-platform
will facilitate e-mail communication, will simplify the design of
Web-sites in Armenian that can be read with a single software from any
corner of the globe, and will increase Armenian-language communication
not only between Armenia and the Diaspora but among diasporan
communities.
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A second Project Committee should be formed by representatives of
important Armenian libraries and depositories of archival material
(ranging from the Matenadaran to the Vienna Mekhitarists and the
Jerusalem Patriarchate to the Library of Congress) to coordinate
efforts and expertise with the purpose of designing a single system of
automated on-line cataloguing of books, periodicals, and other texts,
and to facilitate future research.
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A third Project Committee should draw equally on Homeland and Diaspora
experts to plan web sites that can function as Registries for a
variety of Armenian organizations and activities. Inclusive web
Registries encourage the rise of new diaspora-homeland organizations
around such varied activities as mountain-climbing or hiking or
computer games, and can be particularly useful in bringing together
young people who are otherwise difficult to interest in Armenian
life. Many such registries can be maintained in Armenia and draw on
the considerable Armenian expertise in computing. Individuals such as
Hratch Bayatian, who works for the government, and Tigran Nazarian,
who now works for the UNDP, have already demonstrated the capacity to
innovate imaginatively in these areas.
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A fourth Project Committee might consider the largely positive impact
that satellite broadcasts of Armenian TV have had so far on certain
communities of the Middle East and Europe, and should make
recommendations about regularizing these and perhaps creating a
transnational corporation with joint diasporan and government
ownership, and with broadcast protocols that prevent the domination of
any single viewpoint. Evidence from the Greek, Indian and Korean
diasporas suggests that satellite broadcasts have considerable
outreach among the American and especially the scattered Canadian
diasporas of these groups. Reverse broadcasts, reflecting attitudes
and morals of diaspora co-nationals, have been welcomed by some
homelands but have offended conservative others (in India). In
conjunction with this, ADC99 might consider commissioning a separate,
third Standing Committee on Communications Issues (SCCI) that would
explore the above-named projects and, in addition, initiate work on
the creation of a Communications and Media Department at Yerevan State
University, or a separate Institute for training media
specialists. Such an institute should be at least partly staffed by
diaspora specialists in TV, video and other technologies. As an
example, ADC99 might consider the Boards of several institutes within
Tel Aviv University, such as the Porter Institute, in which there is
heavy diaspora representation (potential donors, technical
specialists).
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Finally, the ADC might consider the creation of a fifth Project
Committee, headed by a homeland resident, to design a system by which
individuals and organizations in the Diaspora can learn about the
publication, costs and ways of obtaining either scholarly or popular
new books, periodicals, audiotapes, CD-ROMs, videos and films from the
homeland. No such system exists since the abolition in the early 1990s
of the Committee on Cultural Relations with Armenians Abroad. Homeland
Armenians may also be interested in ways of finding out about
analogous diaspora products.
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Clearly, there are differences of scale, costs and time-horizons
between, say, the SCED and the Project Committees named above. The
Subcommittee wishes to reiterate that work in one need not be
subordinated to work in the other. Different constituencies exist and
can be called upon to realize different and simultaneous projects.
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The Subcommittee concludes by naming an issue on which it has no
recommendations to make, but which it discussed inconclusively. This
needs to be reported because the ADC may well wish to consider it
further. It involves the role of the embassies of the Republic of
Armenia, whose uneven performance raises the question of whether they
can reliably serve as important nodes in regional communication, as
proper intermediaries between the Homeland and the Diaspora.
Conclusion
Of course, it is up to the Foreign Minister and the Steering Committee
to which this Subcommittee reports to decide which of these issues
should be taken up most urgently by ADC99. This Subcommittee considers
indispensable the Declaration of Principles, because, if properly
formulated, it will have great impact on Diaspora mobilization at no
financial cost. It also considers indispensable the setting up of at
least some committees (such as SCCR) and the adoption of at least one
pan-Armenian project objective (such as the Armenian keyboard). These
will create momentum and will increase the political legitimacy of
ADC99 as it launches a long-term and open-ended process of
communication, consultation and co-operation between the Republic and
the Diaspora.
[ANN/Groong
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